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SUMMARYEuropean Union budget negotiations often focus on member
states' financial net balances, rather than on spending with EU-level added
value. But net positions are an unreliable guide to sound EU policy.
Changing the budget process is a precondition for any significant reform;
the stubborn link between net balances and spending decisions will not be
broken until the decision-making procedure changes. This will improve the
quality of EU budget spending.
POLICY CHALLENGE
Net balance debates are a political reality, so the question is how to deal
with net balances in the least damaging way possible for spending efficien-
cy. Our proposal provides a practical solution to the present fixation on net
balances, while taking account of members states’ constraints. The propos-
al has two main features: i) the separation of EU public goods and redistrib-
utive expenditures in the EU budget, with public goods defined unanimously
– and upfront – by the EU Council and financed according to GNI shares; ii)
negotiation of net balances to determine redistributive expenditures. While
not immediately leading to
large compositional
changes in the EU budget,
our proposal makes
explicit the trade-offs
between spending on EU
public goods and re-
distribution. By increasing
transparency, it would cre-
ate the right political
environment and incen-
tives to move towards
more EU public goods.
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EU budget net balances – where’s the logic?
Source: European Commissionb
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Figure 1: Breakdown of expenditure in EU multiannual financial frameworks
Source: European Commission
1This policy brief draws
on Neheider, S. and I.
Santos (2009)
‘Reframing the EU
budget decision-mak-
ing process’, Journal of
Common Market
Studies(forthcoming).
the nature of the decision-making
process and excessive focus on
net financial balances, ie the dif-
ference between EU spending allo-
cated to a particular member state
and its contribution to the EU
budget (Figure 2). Net positions
tell us nothing about the effects of
EU policies – not even about the
distribution of these effects
across countries – but they are
nonetheless a driving force in
negotiations. Former UK premier
Margaret Thatcher’s ‘I want my
money back’ epitomises this issue
(see Section 3 for a fuller discus-
sion of the UK rebate). Net
balances are problematic for net
contributors since, all else being
equal, they would clearly prefer to
pay less than more, but net
balances also influence the overall
size of the EU budget and affect
the composition of spending.
Since its beginnings, the EU
budget has been used to accom-
modate countries seen to be
losing out from integration. The
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),
for example, is the result of a
1960s Franco-German compro-
mise linked to the benefits accru-
ing to German industry from the
common market.
Member states care more about
the EU budget’s impact on their
accounts than which  policies it is
allocated to. This narrow focus on
net balances has led to inadequate
attention being paid to what
should be the core of the EU
budget – EU public goods – where
EU spending can improve the wel-
fare of the Union’s citizens and the
effectiveness of EU policy. 
Yet while net balances cannot be
ignored, most of the discussion
in periodic multiannual financial
frameworks (MFF) agreed unani-
mously by member states. These
commitments have been associat-
ed with various milestones of the
EU integration process: the single
market (1988-1992), Economic
and Monetary Union (1993-1999)
and, more recently, eastern
enlargement and the Lisbon
Strategy (2000-2006 and 2007-
2013). In some respects, the EU
budget has been responsive to
these challenges, for example  the
expansion of cohesion policy to
facilitate participation of less well-
off member states in the single
market. But in others the EU
budget still falls short. The Lisbon
Strategy is a case in point. In spite
of extensive relabelling, currently
only one tenth of the EU budget is
spent on items directly related to
Lisbon (‘Competitiveness’ in
Figure 1). Three quarters of EU
spending in the past 20 years has
been consistently directed
towards agriculture and structural
policy, leaving little room for new
priorities.
This detachment of EU spending
from political priorities is related to
‘The current budget is more
the expression of different
deals and attempts by govern-
ments to claw back in receipts
as much of their contribution as
possible than a coherent set of
measures.’
The Sapir Report (2004)
THE EU BUDGET
1 is the main
financial instrument of the EU and
authorises EU-level revenue and
spending. It is just one of several
EU instruments, less important
than regulation and coordination.
Since not all policy areas require a
budgetary dimension and only
some are  EU tasks, the EU budget
is relatively small. In 2008, it
amounted to €129 billion or one
percent of EU gross national
income (GNI). While small overall,
the EU budget is significant for cer-
tain areas like agriculture and
cohesion policy (Figure 1).
Smaller amounts are spent on a
wide range of other areas, includ-
ing culture, development,
environment, research, energy
and internal security.
Important revenue and spending
decisions are not made yearly butA BETTER PROCESS FOR A BETTER BUDGET
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Figure 2: EU budget net balances, 2007
Source: European Commission
Table 1:
Additional provisions cohesion
policy 2007-13, final agreement
stage 2005
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Austria 150 11.5%
Czech Republic 200 0.8%
Estonia 50 1.5%
France 100 0.8%
Germany 300 1.3%
Hungary 140 0.6%
Italy 1400 5.5%
Latvia 80 1.9%
Spain 2150 6.8%
Sweden 150 8.9%
Note: These additional allocations are those
which go beyond those in the Luxembourg
presidency’s final proposal. Sources: Authors,
based on DG Regio, Eurostat and Council of the
European Union (2005): Financial
Perspectives 2007-13, December 2005.
has focused on correction
mechanisms that adjust member
states’ net contributions according
to selected criteria such as income
per capita. But this only addresses
the issue of fairness. What is at
least as important is to refocus the
debate on policies.
We propose, in line with other
authors, to separate public goods
from the rest of the budget.
Contrary to other schemes that
define EU public goods in advance,
however, we leave this decision to
the negotiation process. Policies
that attract unanimous support
should be considered public
goods. Reflecting member states’
ability to pay, these should be
financed proportionally to GNI,
while all remaining policies are
pooled in a second group where
net balances are negotiated.
This is an appropriate time to
discuss EU budget reform. The
2005 agreement to conduct a crit-
ical review of EU finances by 2009
shows member states’ dissatis-
faction with the status quo.
Additional pressure arises from
the need to design a substitute for
the Lisbon Strategy by spring
2010 that better aligns EU policy
goals and spending. The European
Commission’s conclusions on the
review are expected in 2010. A dis-
cussion of the EU budget decision-
making procedure should be
included in this review.
In what follows, we start by dis-
cussing the role of net balances in
budgetary negotiations and how
what amounts to ‘financial gerry-
mandering’ has a detrimental
effect on the quality of EU spend-
ing. Section 2 discusses EU budget
decision-making and existing
reform proposals. Finally, we put
forward our own reform proposal
and assess its impact on net
balances.
1 NET BALANCES 
The discussion on the EU budget
boils down to two issues. First,
defining what EU public goods are
(Box 1, overleaf). Second, agree-
ing on the desirable extent of
redistribution within the Union.
Disagreements among member
states on both issues have led to
disputes about net balances.  
Net balances are a fundamental
part of budgetary negotiations
and spending decisions. In the
1970s, more than three quarters
of the EU budget went to
agriculture, causing a major con-
flict with the UK. After ten years
during which the concept of net
positions was discussed explicitly
for the first time, the UK rebate
was introduced in 1984 and has
been followed by further correc-
tions for Germany, the
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.
The issue of side-payments
remains acute. This is particularly
apparent in cohesion policy. The
current financial frameworkb
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BOX 1: AN EFFICIENT EU BUDGET
What the EU budget should look like depends on which tasks ought to
be centralised at the EU level. For this, the theory of fiscal federalism
provides key guidelines, even if the EU is not a federation. 
Fiscal federalism is concerned with allocating powers across
government levels (Oates, 1999). A central government has four main
tasks: maintaining a single market, stabilising the economy, providing
public goods and carrying out redistribution. Given the EU’s limited fis-
cal powers, its focus has been on the first task. The EU budget, at one
percent of EU GNI, plays a limited role in providing public goods and
redistributing wealth. 
In terms of public goods, the EU should focus on areas with major
transnational spillovers and economies of scale, namely basic
research, transport, climate change, defence and foreign policy, in
some of which the current mandate of the EU is limited. There is a
strong argument to be made that redistribution from richer to poorer
member states is also necessary, since major gains are to be made
from stability and growth throughout the EU. Interpersonal
redistribution, on the other hand, is better left to national governments
where powers of taxation lie.
Yet the EU budget today is very much disconnected from these princi-
ples. Few spending categories pass the EU value-added test. Most
spending is essentially about interpersonal or interregional
redistribution, with the CAP and structural funds representing 42
percent and 29 percent of the EU budget, respectively
2. Expenditures
with a clear EU dimension, such as transport, energy networks and
research, account for less than a tenth.
Table 2: 
Member states’ positions in the
2008/2009 budget review
CAP
Wants
change
Wants status
quo
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Czech Republic
Denmark
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Estonia
Finland*
Hungary
Ireland
Latvia*
Lithuania*
Luxembourg*
Portugal
Romania*
Slovakia
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Italy
Malta
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Greece
Poland
Spain
* In favour of poor regions in all countries
receiving regional funds, including those in
richer member states. Source: Authors, based
on DG Budget (2009): Public consultations.
2For a more detailed
discussion, see Santos,
I. (2008) ‘Is structural
spending on solid foun-
dations?’ Bruegel Policy
Brief 2008/02.
includes many instances of pay-
ments going beyond the original
allocation based on the specific
socio-economic characteristics of
regions. Table 1 shows additional
allocations under the heading of
cohesion policy added in the final
negotiating phase of the 2007-
2013 MFF. These side-payments
account for 1.5 percent of total
cohesion receipts for the period,
but their magnitude varies across
countries, representing as much
as 11.5 percent in the case of
Austria.
These side-payments arise both
from disagreements about spend-
ing decisions and pervasive
incentives entrenched in the
decision-making procedure. In the
next budgetary negotiations, due
to start in 2011 at the latest, the
issue of net balances and side-
payments will re-emerge, since
member states disagree on the
direction that the EU budget
should take. This applies especial-
ly to the two policies that absorb
the lion’s share of the EU budget:
cohesion and agriculture (Table 2).
Preoccupation with net balances
in the EU budget is inevitable. It is
important to recognise that these
balances are only one mechanism
through which member states
bargain their way through EU
negotiations. But explicitly
acknowledging the net balances
issue in budgetary negotiations is
a must.
2 REFORMING EU BUDGET
DECISION-MAKING
As in budgetary negotiations in
national parliaments, where inter-
ests diverge and there is often no
link between taxes and expendi-
ture, the EU budget is subject to
the ‘common pool problem’.
Drawing funds from a general
budget to provide public goods
that benefit directly only a small
constituency triggers pork-barrel
politics. In the EU, this translates
into each member state perceiving
that an increase in spending on
targeted policies will provide theirA BETTER PROCESS FOR A BETTER BUDGET
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3For a more detailed
discussion of this litera-
ture see Neheider, S.
and I. Santos (2009).
BOX 2: DECISION-MAKING ON THE MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL
FRAMEWORK 2007-13
March 2004:Commission’s proposal  
2004: Irish and Dutch Council presidencies examine the Commission
proposal
Jan-June 2005:Negotiations start under the Luxembourg presidency
June 2005:European Parliament resolution on Commission proposal
June 2005:European Council fails to agree on MFF
December 2005: Under UK presidency European Council agrees on a
financial framework for 2007-2013. The agreement adjusts the UK cor-
rection to  account for enlargement and mandates a mid-term review of
all EU finances. Compared to  the Commission’s proposal, the overall
budget is reduced from 1.14 percent of GNI to one percent,  CAP spend-
ing is barely changed and spending for  competitiveness (excluding
cohesion spending) and the EU’s external agenda fall by over 58
percent. 
January and April 2006:Parliament,  Council and  Commission  negoti-
ate an inter-institutional agreement on the MFF. 
May 2006: After initially rejecting it, the European Parliament adopts
the inter-institutional agreement, which is then signed  by the three
institutions.
citizens with more resources at
only a fraction of the cost. For
instance, Germany – with approxi-
mately 17 percent of the EU popu-
lation – receives a benefit of
around 17 cents for each euro effi-
ciently spent on EU-wide projects
compared to a benefit of a full euro
from money  spent in Germany. For
small countries, the additional
cost of EU-financed pork barrels is
basically zero. These costs keep
falling  as the number of member
states rises.
Specificities about the EU – espe-
cially the requirement for
unanimity – further exacerbate
this common pool problem. While
the European Parliament and the
Commission participate in  design-
ing MFFs, the major  decision-
maker is the European Council.
This body decides by unanimity on
the financial framework,  which is
subsequently endorsed by the
other two institutions (Box 2).
Under this voting system,  ‘suc-
cess’ depends on landing as much
money as possible for your own
country, regardless of EU-wide
concerns. Moreover, the current
process marginalises the
Parliament and the Commission,
although the pending Lisbon
Treaty does strengthen the role of
the former and institutionalises
the to-date informal MFF.
The MFF has been successful in
ensuring a smooth annual
budgetary procedure by making
the latter largely irrelevant. Three
weaknesses remain. First,
decision-making powers lie with
the Council where each country
has a veto. Working around the
many incompatible interests is
obviously difficult and the
unanimity requirement results in
forward. Three are of special rele-
vance for this policy brief: de la
Fuente et al. (2008), Heinemann
et al. (2008) and Iozzo et al.
(2008)
3. These proposals have
two main features in common.
First, they recommend a correc-
tion mechanism along the lines of
the 2004 European Commission
proposal, providing a refund of a
part of a member state’s net con-
tribution in excess of a certain per-
centage of GNI per capita or a
similar hard criterion. Second, they
differentiate between EU public
goods expenditures and those
whose primary purpose is inter-
personal redistribution, as
proposed by the Sapir report. 
Categorising EU expenditures in
fact dates back to the beginning of
European integration and the
Treaty of Rome (Table 3).
rare and gradual change. Second,
the period of validity of each MFF
does not coincide with the
Commission’s tenure or the parlia-
mentary cycle, thus reducing
accountability. Lastly, no inde-
pendent mechanisms exist for
performance assessment. This
leaves the EU budget disconnect-
ed from the evolving goals and
needs of the Union.
In short, the existing decision-
making procedure encourages
excessive focus on net balances,
distorts spending decisions and
has a status-quo bias. Without
reform, it is difficult to foresee how
the vicious cycle of net balances
and distorted spending can be
broken. 
Several proposals to address
these shortcomings have been putA BETTER PROCESS FOR A BETTER BUDGET
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Table 3:
Financing shares in the
Treaty of Rome
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Belgium 7.9 8.8
Germany 28 32
France 28 32
Italy 28 20
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2
Netherlands 7.9 7
Source: Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community (1957)
4Although an EU tax  is
a desirable EU goal,
there is currently little
appetite for it. Only
Belgium, Luxembourg
and Poland seem to
support the introduc-
tion of an EU tax,
although a few other
member states are
open to the idea in prin-
ciple (DG Budget 2009:
Public consultations).
For reasons of
feasibility, we do not
consider this option
here.
way net balances are arrived at.
We try to affect budgetary out-
comes more directly and provide a
solution that accommodates polit-
ical and financial constraints. We
discuss the details of our reform
proposal below.
3 OUR PROPOSAL
We have argued that reforming the
EU budget requires changes in the
institutional setting and process.
In this section, we propose a new
decision-making procedure and
simulate its effects on net
balances. 
We propose separating the budget
into a public-good part and a redis-
tributive part. Starting from the
current MFF, member states
decide unanimously which expen-
diture categories (or parts of
expenditure categories) are to be
considered category 1 or EU-level
public goods. All remaining
expenditures go into category 2.
Unanimity reveals a common pref-
erence that a specific policy
should be an EU task. 
Moreover, we propose that
category 1 – EU public goods – be
financed proportionally to GNI
4.
Since policies in this category will
have been unanimously consid-
ered EU public goods, there can be
no exceptions. For category 2
expenditures, net balances are
fixed member state by member
state. 
Our proposal therefore has four
steps: 
1 Decide unanimously which
expenditures should go into
category 1 and which into
category 2;
Administrative expenditure and
the European Social Fund, the two
components of the budget at the
time, were viewed distinctly. For
the former, considered a public
good, member states accepted the
principle of sharing the burden
proportionally to GNI; for the latter,
the Italian and Dutch shares were
reduced. This financing mecha-
nism is equivalent to singling out
public goods.
The three recent proposals
described above have two main
limitations. One, by proposing cor-
rection mechanisms they bet on
net balances capturing all effects
important for fairness and neglect
the role of non-financial factors in
budgetary negotiations. Hence,
correction mechanisms do not get
to the core of the problem. Two,
these proposals do not create the
necessary incentives to improve
the quality of EU spending. 
Our proposal also starts from a cat-
egorisation of EU spending but dif-
fers from the cited works in the
2 Establish overall spending ceil-
ings for category 1 and
category 2 separately;
3 Establish spending ceilings for
each policy heading in category
1 (net balances in category 1
are irrelevant);
4 Fix net balances for category 2
and establish spending ceilings
for each policy heading in
category 2.
Only a few items of expenditure
might initially be considered pub-
lic goods (administration and
external policies, for example),
even if the ideal list would be much
longer, as discussed in Box 1. The
rationale behind our proposal is
that making a clear upfront dis-
tinction between types of spend-
ing will increase pressure to move
towards more EU added value, not
immediately but over time. Any
new policy would go into category
1 as, by definition, it will have been
agreed upon unanimously.
While we propose a unanimous
decision on the categorisation of
expenditures (step 1), the
decision on spending levels, at
least for category 1, should be
made by qualified majority voting
(QMV). We recognise, however,
that QMV may not be feasible in
the short term. As a politically
acceptable alternative, unanimity
might apply throughout - as long
as the sequencing of decisions
outlined above is adhered to.
Decisions on net balances and the
structure of category 2 spending
should be part of an iterative
process. After step 2, member
states know their financial contri-
bution to the overall category 2
expenditure, but net balances are
only defined once the spendingA BETTER PROCESS FOR A BETTER BUDGET
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Commission’s calcula-
tion of net balances,
leaving out administra-
tive expenditure and
including corrections.
states and less than five percent
for 22 (Figure 3, scenario 1). There
are both winners and losers. In rel-
ative terms, Cyprus is the big win-
ner (+11 percent) and – pre-
dictably – the UK loses out the
most (-14 percent).
The relative loss of
the UK is less than
with other proposals,
however. In the 2004
Commission proposal
the UK’s negative net
balance doubled. 
As discussed above,
the aim of our proposal is to create
incentives to focus increasingly on
expenditure on EU public goods.
We therefore simulate the impact
on net balances of decreasing CAP
spending by 10 percent and shift-
ing these resources to category 1,
for example to research (Figure 3,
scenario 2). This shift also implies
major changes for the UK, which
would become a net beneficiary as
long as the UK rebate is left
unchanged.
The introduction of the UK rebate
We consider next the effects of
this reform on member states’ net
balances
5. As an illustration, we
include the following budget head-
ings as public goods:
‘Competitiveness for growth and
employment’,
‘Cohesion Fund’,
‘Citizenship, Freedom,
Security and Justice’
and ‘EU as a global
player’. This leaves
the structural funds
and expenditures for
the ‘Preservation and
Management of
Natural Resources’ (mainly CAP)
in category 2. This illustration can
only be indicative, since the cate-
gorisation exercise itself is to be
subject to negotiation. For the pur-
pose of this illustration, we also
leave unchanged the overall size
of the EU budget, although this
may be open to discussion.
This simulation leads to few
changes in net balances. Starting
from the current MFF, the resulting
changes are less than 10 percent
of net balances for 25 member
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Figure 3: Impact of the proposal on EU budget net balances, 2007, % of GNI
Source: Authors, based on European Commission
‘Financial gerry-
mandering’ has a
detrimental effect on
the quality of EU
spending.’
structure is decided. Adjustments
to net balances to reach the politi-
cally agreed levels can take place
on either the spending side, on the
revenue side (ex-post rebates) or
both. Today, adjustments are
made both through rebates and on
the spending side as Table 1 indi-
cated. We propose to leave this
way of adjusting net balances as it
is, since we see category 2, at the
margin, as pure financial
transfers. 
How are net balances in category
2 arrived at? We leave this out-
come to the political process and
stay away from linking net
balances directly to a specific rule
associated with relative income or
any other economic indicator. We
propose to use current net
balances as a benchmark or start-
ing point for negotiation of new net
balances. These net balances may
look random as they are not direct-
ly related to objective indicators
such as relative wealth. But, as we
have argued in this policy brief,
this is hardly the case as they are
only one component of broader
negotiations among member
states on the integration process.
In this way, instead of starting
from net balances our proposal
ends up with them, and leaves
enough room for negotiations that
go beyond EU budget matters.
In sum, our proposal, while not
automatically leading to large
compositional changes in the EU
budget, makes the trade-offs
between EU policy spending and
redistribution explicit. By increas-
ing transparency, it creates
incentives to move towards more
EU public goods as it becomes
harder to justify other
expenditures. b
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in 1984 – and its continuation –
was based on the fact that the CAP
accounts for a large slice of the EU
budget, but the UK benefits less
from it than other countries
because of the UK’s
relatively small farm-
ing sector. In addi-
tion, the UK was in
1984 much less well-
off than now.
But these conditions
are not immutable.
On the former, our
example shows that a
larger focus on EU public goods
would eliminate any justification
for the UK rebate. Moreover, over
the past 25 years, the share of the
CAP has decreased from 65
percent in 1984 to 42 percent
today, while the UK rebate has
actually increased in real terms
from roughly €2 billion to €5 billion
(in 2005 prices). But the UK is
today among the richest member
states, both compared to the EU27
average income per capita (57
percent higher) and compared to
countries such as France (17
percent higher). Therefore, it would
be sensible for the UK to trade a
larger financing share of the EU
budget for a change in decision-
making procedure and
expenditures. 
This points to a possi-
ble intermediate
solution: phasing out
the UK rebate by
excluding public
goods from the net
balance calculation. 
Our proposal makes
explicit the different character of
EU policies. On the one hand, some
clearly have the features of public
goods. On the other hand, there are
spending programmes the under-
lying objective of which is mani-
festly redistributive. Our scheme
seeks to facilitate reform of the EU
budget, allowing for an increasing
share of EU public goods. For this,
we have purposely stayed within
the constraints of the current polit-
ical and economic environment. As
such, our proposal is by no means
a first-best solution.
In short, the proposal put forward
in this policy brief is designed to
provide a practical solution which
accommodates different national
interests while striving for an
increased focus on EU public
goods. Going forward, disagree-
ments among member states are
likely to remain.
It is therefore imperative to focus
now on the necessary institutional
reforms from which policy
changes may emerge. Here, we
have put forward one option that
could serve as a starting point. The
window of opportunity for assess-
ing the merits of institutional
changes is closing rapidly with the
EU budget review process stalled
and with budgetary negotiations
on the next financial framework
expected to start in less than two
years. The ongoing economic crisis
adds to the need for decisive lead-
ership and resolve. It is time for
action.
The authors thank Maite de Sola for
excellent research assistance.
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